The causal discovery research program
In medieval times the philosopher's stone was supposed to enable its possessors to convert base metals into gold. Its discovery would revolutionize the world, presumably not by undermining the value of gold, but by enriching its possessors and ultimately society at large. The stone was never discovered, but, as in many intellectual searches, the by-products of the hunt (such as the science of chemistry) did indeed enrich society. Quite recently another search has started which promises in its most glorious moments to be as revolutionary to society as might have been a philosopher's stone: the search for a computer program which will perform scientific inductions as effectively as do humans. As with the medieval hunt, the goal may well elude us-it certainly seems elusive enough-while the chase may nevertheless generate valuable insights and by-products; indeed, it has done so already.
In this discussion we criticize a recent critique by Paul Humphreys and David led to a growing use and interest in employing Bayesian networks in expert systems (Shafer [1996] ; Heckerman, Mamdani, and Wellman [1995] ), and that in turn has led to a growing interest in the development of techniques for automating the process of building Bayesian networks-that is, in automating the induction of causal models. This goal has been pursued in a variety of ways. All of them take advantage of the conditional independencies implied by causal models to make inferences about the truth or falsity of a causal hypothesis based upon the reflection of conditional independencies in sample data. Despite an extraordinary and odd tradition of disparaging inferences from data to causal hypotheses within the statistics community, such inferences in fact accord perfectly well with inductive practice in the sciences and will be familiar to philosophers of science as being in general accord (ignoring the 'detail' that the data are not formally implied by the hypotheses) with the hypothetico-deductive account of scientific inference. Part I of Glymour et al. [1987] is a thorough and compelling rejection of that odd statistical tradition.
The reflections of conditional independencies in the sample data are zero partial correlations when the causal models are linear. Hence, one path toward the goal of automating induction, that of Spirtes et al. [1993] in their computer program TETRAD II, is to use significance tests on partial correlations to decide whether or not two measured variables are independent given fixed values for some set of other variables. This direct approach to applying orthodox statistical inference procedures to automating induction shares in all of the difficulties that orthodox statistical procedures have, according to Bayesians, such as lack of robustness in dealing with small samples and a failure to accommodate prior information appropriately. 2 We have investigated these difficulties for TETRAD II experimentally elsewhere and Wallace, Korb, and Dai [1996] ). Alternatively, a Bayesian approach to automating like inferences uses an information-theoretic coding to measure the joint probability of the causal model and the data given the model. Models whose joint encodings are shorter, corresponding via Shannon's definition of information to models with higher posterior probability, are preferred. The Bayesian approach has been employed with success for discrete-valued Bayesian networks (e.g. Heckerman, Geiger, and Chickering [1995] ; Madigan et al. [1995] ; Suzuki [1996] ) and for continuous-valued linear causal models ). Humphreys and Freedman, in effect, have launched an attack on all of this research, using Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines [1993] as a target of convenience. If their arguments are right, then all this hot research is just so much hot air. 3 We argue on the contrary that Humphreys and Freedman's arguments are wrong and that not all of the hot research is hot air.
2 Simplifying assumptions: linearity and the Markov condition One objection which Humphreys and Freedman suggest, is that the class of models for continuous variables which SGS have chosen to study, that is models in which variables have normal distributions about means which are linear functions of their parents, is a very limited class, one that has little prospect of finding application to very many real-world problems. This may be so, without it following that it would be better to begin the search for automated inductive methods using more complex models; science, of course, progresses by building up understanding of first simpler and then more complex phenomena, rather than the other way around. In any case, the simplicity of linear models has not prevented the majority of research by statisticians in the social sciences being concerned with them. These methodologists clearly must believe that linear models have some applicability, so issues about relaxing statistical assumptions for automated methods surely can be deferred until we have made good progress within a more limited domain.
The assumption of the Markov condition for causal models-implying, for example, that any variables connected via a common cause and not otherwise will be conditionally independent ('screened off) by fixing the value of the common cause-is perhaps more contentious. Wesley Salmon [1984] and others have argued that there are important classes of physical phenomena which cannot be explained by such models. This might be conceded while also allowing that investigations which assume the Markov condition (i.e. which restrict themselves to hypothesis spaces for which the Markov condition is true) may yet be useful: they may reveal important features of the induction of causal models from data and they may yield important and productive tools. SGS proceed on that basis. Also, they eschew any attempt to provide a reductive definition of causality or even exploring its nature in any depth. For this attitude Humphreys and Freedman are very unforgiving: 'Causation is not proved into the picture, it is assumed in' (p. 115); 'Causation is defined in terms of causation' (p. 116); 'SGS do not give a reductive definition of "A causes B" in non-causal terms. And their axiomatics require that you already understand what causes are ' (p. 116) . But these complaints are well off the mark. It is not just SGS who have given up on reducing causality to non-causal concepts. Two of the most prominent theorists on causality, Wesley Salmon and Nancy Cartwright, have abandoned that goal and, indeed, argue that it is impossible to achieve, that the concept of causality is caught up in a grand circle of concepts such as explanation, action, time, in which the best we can hope for is to articulate their mutual interrelations, rather than reduce them to some underlying observation language. It is quite true that some prior understanding of causality is required to employ any of the SGS tools effectively. But, in fact, anyone likely to use TETRAD n, or study SGS, does have some prior understanding of causality. Nor does it follow that such study will not reveal insight into causality, even if the authors do not pursue the matter very far.
In short, the restrictive assumptions that SGS make for their models provide a reasonable starting point for research into automated induction. Restrictive or not they provide considerable scope for the development of new methods and the investigation of unknown properties of causal structure. For example, it was not known until Verma and Pearl [1990] that given the Markov condition there is a simple graphical criterion for identifying classes of causal models that are statistically equivalent-that is, models which the observational data alone are powerless to distinguish (Chickering [1995] ). The availability of such a criterion is potentially an important statistical and theoretical tool.
Causation and computation
Humphreys and Freedman go on to suggest that the idea of representing causality in computer programs is deeply confused. Most of the tests conducted by SGS consist of using some hypothetical causal model to generate simulated sample data and then running TETRAD II on those data in an attempt to recover the original model. This has the advantage over studies employing real-world data that the result of the algorithmic discovery process can be compared with what we know is the true model underlying the data. However, according to Humphreys and Freedman, this procedure also has some drawbacks:
The statistical assumptions made by SGS are all satisfied, having been programmed into the computer. Simulations tell us very little about the likelihood that SGS's assumptions will be satisfied in real applications. Furthermore, arguments about causation seem out of place in the context of a computer simulation. What can it mean for one computer-generated variable to 'cause' another (p. 118)?
The first part of this objection we have already dismissed. The second part seems to deny that computer simulations of causal phenomena are possible at all. There is certainly no difficulty understanding how the values of some variables within computer programs may stochastically affect the values of other variables, for that is an elementary matter of computer programming. So that surely is not the worry. In any case, researchers who write 'Variable X causes variable Y do not mean to be referring to the internal causal dynamics of a computer program; they mean to be referring to the program as a representation of an external causal system. But then, if computer variables can represent external random variables, and if the procedure used to generate values of one variable based upon those of others can represent some external causal process, then clearly the union of these can represent an external causal system. And there is no reason to suppose that computer variables and computer procedures cannot represent those things.
There surely are legitimate and important questions to raise about the epistemological status of computer simulations. Do computer cosmological models which simulate the generation of galaxy clusters in something like the arrangement that astronomers in fact observe demonstrate the correctness of their assumptions? That is at best unclear-its truth depending upon such issues as the degrees of freedom those assumptions allowed and the availability of alternative sets of assumptions which can produce the same observable results. But what is not unclear is that if a causal theory can be represented computationally, then we can use a computer to explore its causal consequences, something which Humphreys and Freedman inexplicably seem to doubt.
Causation and correlation, again
As Humphreys and Freedman acknowledge, '[when a] probability distribution is faithful to a graph for which the Markov condition holds, that graph can be inferred (in whole or in part) from conditional independence relations defined by the distribution' (p. 115). As there typically exist statistically equivalent models, the most we can generally infer is a partial causal model from such independencies. But in any case when dealing with real data we shall not have the luxury of knowing which probabilistic independencies they represent; if nothing else, we shall have to contend with sampling errors in the data. Therefore, there will be no question of deductively inferring the right class of statistically equivalent models. Rather, we shall accumulate evidence for or against classes of models. Now at this point, when considering how to assess statistical evidence relevant to causal models, we shall have to part company with Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines, since we hold that a Bayesian assessment of the evidence is preferable. SGS prefer instead to employ classical significance testing. Hence, when Humphreys and Freedman complain that SGS do not 'cope' with the statistical data (p. 117), and specifically that t-tests make errors and multiple t-tests compound the errors, we cannot but agree. Indeed, we have compared a Bayesian method for causal discovery and found it superior to TETRAD II in recovering causal models from the same data sets ; Dai etal. [1996] ). However, Humphreys and Freedman exaggerate the difficulties for SGS well beyond what is sensible (p. 117): 'Exact conditional independence cannot be verified, even in principle, by mere statisticians using real data. Approximate conditional independence-which is knowable-has no consequences in the SGS scheme of things.' If they are using 'verified' in something less than the exacting, and unrealistic, sense of the logical positivists, then the first assertion is false: the existence of conditional independencies can be either confirmed or disconfirmed by statistical data. The second assertion is in any event false: TETRAD II is quite capable of picking up the existence of conditional independencies when given sufficient sample data and from these concluding correctly that all the causal models within a certain set are false and some one of the remaining models is true. Furthermore, our own experiments show that TETRAD II converges upon the true model given enough data, albeit more slowly than our Bayesian program.
A lack of realism in the discussion is strongly suggested by Humphreys and Freedman's remark that 'the SGS algorithms must depend quite sensitively on the data and even on the underlying distribution: tiny changes in the circumstances of the problem have big impacts on causal inferences' (p. 117). In a footnote to this they say, 'Thus, a correlation that equals 0.000 precludes certain kinds of confounding and permits causal inference; a correlation that equals 0.001 has no such consequences.' But the significance of weak causal relationships for causal inference depends upon the size of the sample available. For small samples correlations equal to 0.001 have no implications for causal inference, as they will not be detectable; for sufficiently large samples they will not only be detectable, they will be unavoidably obvious. It would simply be absurd to hold it a defect of TETRAD n that it fails to detect faint causal relationships when given only tiny samples, since no algorithm and no human does otherwise. If the claim was intended to be that for reasonably sized samples TETRAD II is missing the implications of relevant data, then Humphreys and Freedman have not presented a case, as we have done elsewhere and Korb [1997] ).
5 The evidence from real data Humphreys and Freedman close their argument with a critical examination of cases where SGS have used real, rather than simulated, data. In such cases we are not likely to be in the preferred position of knowing the causal model which has generated the data. The best test of the adequacy of an automated induction algorithm is probably just how happy experts within the area of research which has produced the data are with the models reported. If domain experts are in universal agreement about some causal theory, we can hope that our algorithms will agree with their opinion, and if they are not, we can be sure that our algorithms will disagree with some of the models produced by experts. Humphreys and Freedman demand the use of real cases in assessing causal models, but when SGS apply TETRAD II to real data they accuse them of having no standards of assessment (p. 119): 'Apparently, SGS count a win if their algorithms more or less reproduce the original findings (rule no. 1); but they also count a win if their algorithms yield different findings (rule no. 2). This sort of empirical test is not particularly harsh.' Humphreys and Freedman neglect to note that this is the natural outcome of their disfavour for testing with simulated data.
In discussing a case with real data that Rindfuss et al. [1980] studied, Humphreys and Freedman point out that TETRAD II when presented with the same data 'discovers' that race and religion 'cause' area of residence. They suggest this is an error, without elaboration. If the notion is that in many cases (or perhaps just the case at hand) it seems more likely that geography determines race and religion than the reverse, then the following comments are in order.
(1) We are prepared to agree, although from the discussion it is not clear whether the data collected are sufficient to judge the issue. 4 (2) If Humphreys and Freedman are relying upon the reversed causal directions being common background knowledge, then it is curious that they fail to provide this knowledge to TETRAD II: although only limited prior information (constraints) can be put into TETRAD II, it is just this kind of prior information that it in fact supports (which variables are not allowed to cause which others). (3) The sociologists themselves simply ignored the question of the relation between these variables, since their variables of interest (the 'dependent' variables which they wished to predict) were education level and age, leaving the others as 'independent' variables. Therefore, although SGS might be charged with selectively presenting only the more favourable parts of their recovered model, this seems a minor indiscretion. 5 In a final misunderstanding, Humphreys and Freedman object relative to the same example that TETRAD II has impossibly and incoherently found a 'linear regression' for location of residence when that variable is discretely valued. However, TETRAD II was provided with the sample covariance table and then run under the assumption that all relationships recorded therein are linear. What SGS are counting as success is the extent to which TETRAD II can recover structural causal relationships and, in particular, that the structure it recovers with Rindfuss's data is close to their explanatory model. The fact that the true causal relationship is not linear does not mean that it cannot be detected using tests that assume linearity.
Conclusion
We suspect that what underlies much of the unease that statisticians show with causal inference, and the distaste Humphreys and Freedman show for the causal discovery research program, is a belief that causality as humans know it incorporates something too profound for mere machines to understand or for algorithmic processes to capture. Perhaps humans attain causal understanding by some unexplicated, or even inexplicable, process of insight; machines, therefore, do not and cannot attain causal understanding. If such a thought does underlie these repeated objections, we wish the objectors would advance their reasons openly. We know of no reason to believe that human understanding or causal knowledge is so special that it cannot be understood and accounted for, and if these objectors would share their reasons then they might be subjected to the open criticism which seems to be necessary to the advancement of human knowledge. In the meantime, we suggest that causal theories as they have been presented in the causal discovery literature (supposing that the limitations of the simplifying assumptions are later overcome) are fully satisfactory to do the work we can reasonably expect of causal knowledge-namely, understanding, manipulating, and predicting events in the physical world. If there is no additional epistemological work that the objectors' 'special' causal knowledge might be doing, then there is no reason we know of to think that causal knowledge is so special as to evade capture by computational processes. Humphreys and Freedman conclude with a hint that they do indeed attribute a special, unexplained role for human insight (p. 121): 'SGS seem to buy the Automation Principle: the only worthwhile knowledge is the knowledge that can be taught to a computer. This principle is perverse.' We do not know that the Automation Principle is true: we grant that some knowledge may be representable or usable only via non-computable processes (despite our belief that Roger Penrose's arguments to that effect go bust).
6 Even granting a mysterious (and dubious) notion of insight, the extent to which human knowledge, or other knowledge, is susceptible to automation surely remains an open question, and it is an important one to answer, since its pursuit is likely to lead to further significant understanding of understanding as well as to further useful technological developments. Humphreys and Freedman apparently prefer to shut down such research on the ground of an alleged perversity. The search for the philosopher's stone of an algorithm for induction may be a kind of perversion, but that is no more reason to end it now than the like charge would have been to prematurely end alchemy or Aristotelian physics when they were young. The search for a new science of induction is a glorious perversion.
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